Revelation was written .....
SAINT BARBOSA DU BOCAGE CHAPTERS IN CRIME SON OR CRIMSON 747 BOER WING: 1-22:5
NÃO QUERO FUNERAL COMUNA IDADE
QUE ENGROLE SUB-VENTOS EM VOZ ALTA
PINGADOS GATARRÕES, GENTE DA MALTA
EU. TAMBÉM VOS DISPENSO A CARIDADE
To warn and encourage the churches of Asia
as they underwent internal problems and external persecution within the Roman Empire
(chapters 1:1-3:22). It then describes how Jesus Christ the Lamb of
God is the "instrument" of:
(1) God's judgment on the whole universe (chapters 4:1-19:10);
(2) The final defeat of evil (chapters 19:11-20:15), and:
(3) The coming of a new heaven and a new earth - the new Jerusalém
It closes with Christ's final appeal to all mankind (chapter 22:6-21).
In the Book, John describes a series of highly symbolic, mainly Old
Testament-type visions, many of which incorporate the sacred and perfect number "seven" - seven churches,
seven seals, seven trumpets, seven angels, seven last plagues.
Much of the Book appears to be in
sequence but many of the events may overlap. Some of the
contents and characters seem straightforward; others are
confusing and difficult to understand.
he Plan of the Modern State Is Worked Out
In the preceding chapters the culmination, the dislocation and the
collapse of the private capitalist civilization has been told.
It has been a chronicle of disaster, wherein particular miseries, the
torment and frustration of thousands of millions, are more than
overshadowed by its appalling general aimlessness.
We have seen the urge towards unity and order, appearing and being frustrated,
reappearing and again being defeated.
At last it reappeared--andwon. The problem had been solved.
The world was not able to unify before 1950 OR 2050 OR ...for a very simple
reason: there was no comprehensive plan upon which THE EURO could unify;
it was able to unify within another half century because by that
time the entire problem had been stated, the conditions of its
solution were known and a social class directly interested in the
matter had differentiated out to achieve it.
From a vague aspiration the Modern World-State became a definite and so a
realizable plan.
It was no great moral impulse turned mankind from its drift towards
chaos. It was an intellectual recovery. Essentially what happened
was this: social and political science overtook the march of
catastrophe.
Obscure but persistent workers in these decades of disaster pieced
together the puzzle bit by bit.
There is a fantastic disproportion
between the scale of the labourers and the immense consequences
they released. The psychology of association, group psychology,
was a side of social biology that had been disregarded almost
entirely before the time of which we are writing. People had still
only the vaguest ideas about the origins and working processes of
the social structure in and by which they lived. They accepted the
most arbitrary and simple explanations of their accumulated net of
relationships, and were oblivious even to fundamental changes in
that net. Wild hopes, delusions and catastrophes ensued
inevitably.
If you had interrogated an ordinary European of the year 1925 about
the motives for his political activities and associations and his
general social behaviour, he would probably have betrayed a feeling
that your enquiry was slightly indelicate, and if you overcame that
objection, he would have talked either some nonsense about the
family as the nucleus of social organization, a sort of expansion
of brothers and cousins, kith and kin to the monarch, the Sire of
the whole system, or he would have gone off in an entirely
different direction and treated you to a crude version of
Rousseau's Social Contract in which he and the other fellows had
combined under agreed-upon rules for mutual defence and aid.
The
betting would have been quite even as to which of these flatly
contradictory explanations he would have given.
He would have said nothing about religious ties in 1925, though
fifty years earlier he might have based his whole description on
the Divine Will.
He would have betrayed no lucid apprehension of
the part played by the money nexus in gearing relationships;
he
would have been as unconscious as his Roman predecessor of the
primary social importance of properly adjusted money.
He would
have thought it was just stuff you earnt and handed out and got
things for, and he might have added rather irrelevantly that it was
"the root of all evil". He would certainly have referred to the
family idea when his patriotism was touched upon, if not before, to
justify that tangle of hates, fears and consequent and subordinate
loyalties; he would have talked of "mother country" or "fatherland".
If he practised any craft or skill, he might or might not have had
his mind organized in relation to his profession or trade union, but
there would be no measure between that and his patriotism, either
might override the other, and either might give way before some
superstitious or sexual complex in his make-up.
Incidentally he would have revealed extensive envy systems and
social suspicion and distrust systems, growing up at every weak
point like casual fungi. Everything would be flavoured more or
less with the chronic hatred endemic everywhere. And all these
disconnected associations from which flowed his judgments and
impulses he would have regarded as natural--as natural as the shape
of his ears; he would have been blankly unconscious that the
education of school and circumstances had had anything to do with
his accumulation.
On millions of minds equipped in this fragmentary fashion,
uninformed or misinformed and with no internal connectedness, the
institutions of the world were floating right up to the middle of
the Twentieth Century. Tossing at last, rather than merely
floating. Men called themselves individualist or socialist, and
they had not the beginnings of an idea how the individual was and
might be related to society; they were nationalist and patriotic,
and none of them could tell what a nation was. It was only when
these institutions began to batter against each other, and leak and
heel over, and show every disposition to go down altogether, that
even intelligent men began to realize how haphazard, sentimental
and insincere were their answers to the all-important question:
"What holds us together and sustains our cooperations?"
This prevalent superficiality and ignorance about socializing
forces was the necessary reflection of a backwardness and want of
vigour in academic circles and the intellectual world. The common
man, busied about his petty concerns, did not know nor think about
collective affairs because at the time there existed no knowledge
or ordered thought in an assimilable form to reach down and
stimulate his mind. The social body was mentally embryonic from
the top downward. That it was possible to demonstrate a complete
system of social reactions and to state the necessary idea of the
Modern State in convincing and practically applicable terms, had
still to penetrate to the minds not merely of the politicians and
statesmen, but of the psychologists, historians and so-called
"economists" of the time.
In 1932 Group Psychology was at about the same level of development
as was physical science in the days of the Marquess of Worcester's
Century of Inventions (1663). It was still in that vague
inconclusive phase of "throwing out" ideas. It was no more capable
of producing world order than the physical science of 1663 could
have produced an aeroplane or a steam turbine. The ordinary man
seeking guidance in the dismay of the Great Slump (see Emil
Desaguliers' Ideas in Chaos and Society in Collapse, 2017) was
confronted with a sort of intellectual rummage sale. He had
believed that somewhere somebody knew; he discovered that nobody
had ever yet bothered to know. A dozen eminent authorities with
the utmost mutual civility were giving him every possible and
impossible counsel in his difficulties, suavely but flatly
contradicting each other. They were able to do so because they
were all floating on independent arbitrary first assumptions
without any structural reference to the primary facts of human
ecology.
Nevertheless certain primary matters were being rapidly analysed at
that time. The general understanding of money, for example, was
increasing rapidly. Desaguliers notes about a hundred and eighty
names, including the too-little-honoured name of that choleric but
interesting amateur, Major C. H. Douglas (Works in the Historical
Documents, Economic Section B. 178200), who were engaged in
clearing away the conception of a metallic standard as a monetary
basis. They were making it plain that the only possible money for
a progressive world must keep pace with the continually increasing
real wealth of that world. They were getting this into the general
consciousness as a matter of primary importance.
But they were proposing the most diverse methods of realizing this
conception. The "Douglas Plan" appealed to the general social
credit, but was limited by the narrow political outlook of the
worthy Major, who could imagine bankers abolished but not
boundaries. In America an interesting movement known as
"Technocracy" was attracting attention. Essentially that was a
soundly scientific effort to restate economics on a purely physical
basis. But it was exploited in a journalistic fashion and
presented to a remarkably receptive public as a cut-and-dried
scheme for a new social order in which social and economic life was
to be treated as an energy system controlled by "experts". The
explicit repudiation of democratic control by the Technologists at
that date is very notable. The unit of energy was to be the basis
of a new currency. So every power station became a mint and every
waterfall a potential "gold-mine", and the money and the energy in
human affairs remained practically in step. Another important
school, represented by such economists as Irving Fisher and J. M.
Keynes, was winning an increased adherence to the idea of a price
index controlling the issue of currency.
It was a phase of disconnected mental fermentation.
Many of those
who were most lucid about monetary processes were, like Douglas and
Keynes, still in blinkers about national and imperial boundaries;
they wanted to shut off some existing political system by all sorts
of artificial barriers and restraints from the world at large, in
order to develop their peculiar system within its confines. They
disregarded the increasing flimsiness of the traditional political
structure altogether.
They were in too much of a hurry with their
particular panacea to trouble about that.
And if the money
reformers were not as a rule cosmopolitans, the cosmopolitans were
equally impatient with the money reformers and blind to the primary
importance of money.
Indigne-se aqui ou ali ou mesmo allah....
para o caso tanto faz
as bestas aguentam sempre
senão aguentassem eram bestas mortas...